Adolph Dubs[1] (August 4, 1920 – February 14, 1979), also known as Spike Dubs, was an American diplomat who served as the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan from May 13, 1978, until his death in 1979.[2] He was killed during a rescue attempt after his kidnapping.
At the time of his death he was married to his second wife Mary Anne Dubs, a Washington-based journalist. He was previously married for over 30 years to Jane Wilson Dubs (1922–1993), his college girlfriend from Beloit College, whom he married in 1945 and divorced in 1976. He had one daughter, Lindsay Dubs McLaughlin (1953–), who lives in West Virginia.[7]
Kidnapping and death
In 1978, Dubs was appointed United States Ambassador to Afghanistan following the Saur Revolution, a coup d'état which brought the Soviet-aligned Khalq faction to power.[8][9] He was being driven from his residence to the U.S. embassy shortly before 9 a.m. on February 14, 1979, on the same day that Iranian militants attacked the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran, and just months before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He was approaching the U.S. Cultural Center when four men stopped his armored black Chevrolet limousine.[10][11][12] Some accounts say that the men were wearing Afghan police uniforms,[10] while others state that only one of the four was wearing a police uniform.[11] The men gestured to the car to open its windows, which were bulletproof, and the ambassador's driver complied.[10][12] The militants then threatened the driver with a pistol, forcing him to take Dubs to the Kabul Hotel[10][12] in downtown Kabul.[11] The abduction occurred within sight of Afghan police.[11] Dubs was held in Room 117 on the first floor of the hotel,[10] and the driver was sent to the U.S. embassy to tell the U.S. of the kidnapping.[10]
At the hotel, the abductors allegedly demanded that the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) release "one or more religious or political prisoners."[11] "No demands were made of the American government, nor did the DRA ever give a complete or consistent account of the kidnappers' desires."[11] Some accounts state that the militants demanded the exchange of Tahir Badakhshi, Badruddin Bahes (who may have already been dead), and Wasef Bakhtari.[13]
The U.S. urged waiting in order not to endanger Dubs' life, but the Afghan police disregarded these pleas to negotiate and attacked on the advice of Soviet officers.[13][14][15] The weapons and flak jackets used by the Afghans were provided by the Soviets, and the hotel lobby had multiple Soviet officials, including the KGB security chief, the lead Soviet advisor to the Afghan police, and the second secretary at the Soviet embassy.[10][15] At the end of the morning, a shot was heard.[10] Afghan police then stormed Room 117 with heavy automatic gunfire.[10][12] After a short, intense firefight, estimated at 40 seconds[11] to one minute,[10][15] Dubs was found dead, killed by shots to the head.[10] Two abductors died in the firefight, as well.[11] An autopsy showed that he had been shot in the head from a distance of six inches.[12] The other two abductors were captured alive but were shot shortly afterwards; their bodies were shown to U.S. officials before dusk.[11]
The true identity and aims of the militants are uncertain,[16] and the crime "has never been satisfactorily explained" although U.S., Afghan, and Soviet officials "were all but eyewitnesses" to it.[11] The circumstances have been described as "mysterious"[11][17] and "still clouded."[18] Several factors obscured the events, including the killing of the surviving captors, lack of forensic analysis of the scene, lack of access for U.S. investigators, and planting of evidence. Soviet or Afghan conspiracy was not proven.[15]
Some attribute responsibility for the kidnapping and murder to the leftist anti-Pashtun group Settam-e-Melli,[19][20] but others consider that to be dubious, pointing to a former Kabul policeman who has claimed that at least one kidnapper was part of the Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.[21] Disinformation that was spread in the Soviet and Afghan press after the murder blamed the incident on the CIA, Hafizullah Amin, or both.[11][12] Anthony Arnold suggested that "it was obvious that only one power… would benefit from the murder—the Soviet Union," as the death of the ambassador "irrevocably poisoned" the U.S.–Afghan relationship, "leaving the USSR with a monopoly of great power influence over" the Nur Muhammad Taraki government.[11] Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that Dubs' death "was a tragic event which involved either Soviet ineptitude or collusion",[12] while the Afghan handling of the incident was "inept."[22] The Taraki government refused U.S. requests for an investigation into the death.[14]
The Carter administration was outraged by the murder of the ambassador and by the conduct of the Afghan government, and began to disengage from Afghanistan and express sympathy with Afghan regime opponents.[14] The incident hastened the decline in U.S.–Afghan relations, causing the United States to make a fundamental reassessment of its policy.[14] In reaction to Dubs' murder, the U.S. immediately cut planned humanitarian aid of $15 million by half and canceled all planned military aid of $250,000,[13] and the U.S. terminated all economic support by December 1979, when the Soviet occupation of the country was complete.[14] The Afghan government aimed to diminish the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and restricted the number of Peace Corps volunteers and cultural exchange programs.[14] On July 23, the State Department announced the withdrawal of non-essential U.S. embassy staff from Kabul and the majority of the diplomats as security deteriorated, and the U.S. only had some 20 staff members in Kabul by December.[14][23] Dubs was not replaced by a new ambassador, and a chargé d'affaires led the skeleton staff at the embassy.[24]
The death of Dubs was listed as a "Significant Terrorist Incident" by the State Department.[25] Documents released from the Soviet KGB archives by Vasily Mitrokhin in the 1990s showed that the Afghan government clearly authorized the assault despite forceful demands for peaceful negotiations by the U.S., and that KGB adviser Sergei Bakhturin may have recommended the assault, as well as the execution of a kidnapper before U.S. experts could interrogate him.[26] The Mitrokhin archives also indicate that the fourth kidnapper escaped and the body of a freshly killed prisoner served as a substitute for the U.S. inspection.[27] Other questions remain unanswered.[28]
According to Mitrokhin, the Soviets were alarmed by Dubs becoming U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. Worried Dubs knew the region deeply and had CIA ties, they saw his appointment as a U.S. attempt to sway the new Afghan government and prevent them from aligning with the USSR. A KGB agent in Kabul in August 1978, Viliov G. Osadchy expressed deep concern about Dubs becoming ambassador. Not only did they perceive him as knowledgeable and potentially linked to the CIA, but they also feared he would leverage his understanding of the USSR and foreign policy to influence Afghan leaders. This, they saw as "one of the most dangerous aspects" of Dubs' activities. The agent further claimed the US embassy, led by Dubs, was actively using propaganda among civilians and intellectuals to paint the USSR as an occupying force aiming to expand its influence to neighbouring countries.[29]
Mitrokhin writes that Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul on 14 February 1979 by unknown assailants and held hostage at the Hotel Kabul. They demanded the release of two already-executed members of Settam-e-Melli group, sparking confusion. Following Soviet advice, Amin ordered a brutal armed raid using Soviet equipment. Dubs and two attackers were killed, one captured, and another escaped despite the attackers being outgunned.[30]
During the Dubs kidnapping event, Soviet officials at the hotel (Bakhturin, security assistant Yu. I. Kutepov, secretaries including A. S. Klushnikov, and an advisor) pushed for a forceful solution. They wanted to avoid negotiations, media attention, and any American involvement. After the deadly raid, they even staged evidence by planting a gun and preventing bullet shell collection. It seems they aimed to control the narrative and hide potential involvement or responsibility.[30]
Fearing US scrutiny, Soviet officials (Osadchy and another Soviet advisor) met with Amin to craft a cover story for Dubs' death. The plan involved condolences, lowered flags, staged photos of dead "terrorists," and eliminating potential witnesses.[30]
After toppling Amin, the Soviets spun a new tale about Dubs' death:
Dubs was kidnapped by Shiite Muslims opposing Amin's brutal regime.
The "terrorists" forced Dubs to confess US ties to Amin, aiming to expose their collaboration.
Amin, acting as an American/CIA puppet, ordered an unnecessary raid, leading to Dubs' death.
The "terrorists" were killed or eliminated to silence potential witnesses proving Amin's CIA ties
This rewrite paints Amin as the villain for suppressing Muslims and colluding with the US, blames him for Dubs' death, and justifies silencing potential truth-tellers. It paints the Soviets as righteous liberators rectifying Amin's mistakes.[31]
^ abcdefghijkJ. Robert Moskin, American Statecraft: The Story of the U.S. Foreign Service (Thomas Dunne Books, 2013), p. 594.
^ abcdefghijklmAnthony Arnold, Afghanistan, the Soviet Invasion in Perspective (Hoover Press, 1985), p. 79.
^ abcdefgDick Camp, Boots on the Ground: The Fight to Liberate Afghanistan from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Zenith, 2012), pp. 8–9.
^ abcDorronsoro, Gilles (2005). Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. Columbia University Press. p. 87.
^ abcdefgJagmohan Meher, America's Afghanistan War: The Success that Failed (Kalpaz Publications, 2004), p. 64.
^ abcdJohn Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p. 468.
^Mohammad Khalid Ma'aroof, Afghanistan in World Politics: A Study of Afghan–U.S. Relations (Gian Publishing House, 1987), p. 117.
^Shawn Dorman, Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America (American Foreign Service Association, 2003), p. 104.
^Robert C. Gray & Stanley J. Michalak, American Foreign Policy Since Détente (Harper & Row, 1984), p. 99.
^Diego Cordovez & Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 34–35.
^Jagmohan Meher, America's Afghanistan War: The Success that Failed (Gyan Books, 2004), p. 64.
^Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan, the Soviet Invasion in Perspective (Hoover Press, 1985), p. 154.
^J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Diane Publishing, 1994), p. 44.
^Samuel M. Katz, Relentless Pursuit: The DSS and the Manhunt for the Al-Qaeda Terrorists (Macmillan, 2002), p. 288.
^U.S. Foreign Police and the Third World: Agenda 1968–86 (John W. Sewell, Richard E. Feinburg, & Valeriana Kallab, eds., Overseas Development Council, 1985), pp. 125–26.
^Mitrokhin, Vasiliy (July 2002). "The KGB in Afghanistan"(PDF). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. pp. 150–151. Retrieved February 14, 2024.
^ abcMitrokhin, Vasiliy (July 2002). "The KGB in Afghanistan"(PDF). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. p. 151. Retrieved February 14, 2024.
^Mitrokhin, Vasiliy (July 2002). "The KGB in Afghanistan"(PDF). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. p. 152. Retrieved February 14, 2024.
"Ambassador Dubs' Letter to his Daughter". The National Museum of American Diplomacy. March 3, 1973. Retrieved September 30, 2024. I personally don't like to think of being any kind of a martyr; but if I were ever taken in a situation such as that which occurred in Khartoum, I would want Washington to understand that I would rather sacrifice my life than to have someone capitulate to the demands of terrorists
