The Battle of Segheneyti,[6] or Saganèiti, was a small clash fought on August 8, 1888[6] between the troops of the Kingdom of Italy and Abyssinian irregulars towards the end of the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887-1889. The battle resulted in the destruction of Italian attachment that was deployed to Segheneyti.[7]
Battle
In July 1888 the troops of General Antonio Baldissera began operations to extend Italian possessions in Eritrea, starting from the already acquired Massawa they targeted the plateau cities of Keren and Asmara. During this phase the Italians faced the problem of a local leader, Debeb, who close to RasAlula and previously in their service. Debeb and his irregulars had deserted in March 1888, after the troops of General San Marzano had led raids against the tribes which submitted to the Italians.[8]
The task of capturing Debeb and dispersing his band was entrusted by Baldissera to captain Cornacchia, who headed a contingent of 400 "bashi-bazouk", 300 local irregulars and four Italian officers.[9] The contingent departed from Ua-a on 4 August 1889, to the village of Segeneiti, where, according to the spies, Debeb's camp was located.
The attack on Debeb was supposed to be a surprise, but this plan failed because it took longer than anticipated for Italian troops to reach Segheneyti, giving Ethiopian forces enough time to be made aware of the attack.[10] When Italian forces finally arrived on August 8, 1888, the Italian contingent occupied Segheneyti, but Debeb was not found there, having been warned in time, and had fled the village to stand with his troops on the nearby heights. From there Debeb's superior forces ambushed the Cornish column; after killing the captain and other Italian officers, the contingent disbanded and retreated to Massawa, leaving about 200 casualties on the field.
Aftermath
The defeat, though minor, drew heavy criticism towards Baldissera; In response, the general offered his resignation, which was rejected by the prime minister Francesco Crispi, who reaffirmed his confidence in the general's work. "The first group of askari was formed in October 1888, after the débacle of the basci-buzuk at Saganeiti, seen almost as a second Dogali, where all the Italian officers died while the 800 irregulars fled, followed by Debeb's men who killed around three hundred of them."[11]
In the Italian army, the skirmish was considered a "massacre"[1] - while most irregular Italian-aligned forces (referred to as basci-buzuk) fled, all Italian officers had been slain. The defeat at Segheyneyti prompted Italian command to reform their army organization - in October 1888, the first group of askari was formed to replace the basci-buzuk.[12] After Italian forces took Segheneyti later in 1888, the local Coptic church in Segheneyti was destroyed and a new Catholic one was erected in its place to honour Cornacchia.[1]
The battle had a profound impact of Italian strategy in Ethiopia and its approach towards indigenous troops. In early 1888, indigenous troops were hailed by Italian command as fighters that could "run some tens of kilometers without water, food or rest, that they could subsist on only a ‘fistful’ of wheat per day, and that they were responsible for their own provisioning". Italy would steadily increase its dependence on irregular native troops, and send Italian forces back to Europe. The defeat at Segheneyti forced Italy to reconsider its strategy. Italian public initially blamed the defeat on indigenous fighters themselves, with Italian newspapers condemning indigenous troops as disloyal and treacherous. However, Italian commanders argued that "indigenous troops sent to Saganeiti had shown a willingness to fight so long as their Italian officers were still alive". From that point, native troops were reformed to be more organized and better equipped, and went through Italian led training; lastly, more Italian officers were assigned to them.[13]
^ abcComaron, Giorgia. Tracce di pittura etiopica nelle pubblicazioni ed esposizioni dell'Italia colonialista: spunti di riflessione (in Italian). Università degli Studi di Padova. p. 81.
^CAULK, R.
— 1984 "Bad Men of the Borders: ‘Shum' and ‘Shifta' in Northern Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century", The Journal of African Historical Studies 2 (17): 201-227.
^NEGASH, T.
— 1984 "Resistance and Collaboration in Eritrea", in S. RUBENSON (ed.), Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies; East Lansing: African Studies Center, Michigan State University): 315-325.
^BATTAGLIA, R. — 1958 La prima guerra d'Africa (Torino: Einaudi): 342-345
^Bruner, S. (2014). Conflicting obituaries: The Abyssinian ‘outlaw’ Debeb as treacherous bandit and romantic hero in late nineteenth-century Italian imagination. Modern Italy, 19(4), 405-419. doi:10.1080/13532944.2014.939164
^Bruner, Stephen C. (2017). Late Nineteenth-Century Italy in Africa: The Livraghi Affair and the Waning of Civilizing Aspirations. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. p. 75. ISBN978-1-4438-4376-8.
^The Seen, the Unseen, the Invented Misrepresentations of African "Otherness" in the Making of a Colony. Eritrea, 1885-1896, Silvana Palma, p. 39-69, https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesafricaines.14887
^Bruner, Stephen C. (2014). "'At Least So Long As We Are Talking About Marching, the Inferior Is Not the Black, It's the White': Italian Debate over the Use of Indigenous Troops in the Scramble for Africa". European History Quarterly. 44 (1): 33–54. doi:10.1177/0265691413513421.
^Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica of the Kingdom of Italy 8 May 1889
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