The operational ships of the remaining Royal Indian Navy, minus Pakistan, were initially placed under the command of the Commodore Commanding Indian Naval Squadron (COMINS), later the Rear-Admiral Commanding Indian Naval Squadron (RACINS), whose title was then changed to Flag Officer (Flotilla) Indian Fleet (FOFIF). These appointments were initially held by British officers: Commodore H.N.S. Brown, who was the Commanding Officer of INS Delhi (C74) and serving as COMINS, seemingly at the same time, and later, Commodore (later Rear Admiral) Geoffrey Barnard who became COMINS and later Rear-Admiral Commanding, INS.[4] The Flotilla was later upgraded to the Indian Fleet under a Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (FOCIF).[5]
On the proclamation of a Republic in 1950, the 'Royal' title was dropped and the Navy became simply the Indian Navy. Barnard was succeeded by Rear Admiral N.V. ("Uncle Richard") Dickinson, Rear Admiral F.A. Ballance, and then the final British officer Rear AdmiralSt John Tyrwhitt as FOCIF.[4] In 1956, Rear AdmiralRam Dass Katari became the first Indian flag officer, and was appointed the first Indian FOCIF on 2 October, when he took over from Rear Admiral Tyrwhitt.[6][7] (title alternately given as Flag Officer (Flotilla).[8] In 1957, INS Mysore (C60) was commissioned, and the flag of Rear Admiral Katari was transferred, INS Mysore thus becoming the flagship of the Indian Fleet.[9]
"To destroy the enemy's maritime forces deployed in support of his military operations in East Bengal and to deny all sustenance from reaching the enemy from the sea. This aim would involve keeping under the most careful surveillance the area of a triangle with a base of 270 miles and two sides of 165 and 225 miles, involving 18,000 square miles. Apart from actual surveillance, each merchant ship in this area would have to be challenged, identified and boarded. If neutral and carrying contraband, the ship would have to be escorted to the nearest Indian port. If Pakistani, she would be boarded, captured and taken in as a war prize. Ships that refused to stop would have to be forced to do so. The main task would be the isolation of Chittagong. This would mean physical attack on this port from the sea and the air. The responsibility for this, it had been agreed with the Army and Air Force would be, in the main, that of the Navy."[14]
According to Rear Admiral S H Sarma, the Fleet Commander, the tasks of the Eastern Fleet were:
To seek and destroy enemy naval units at sea
To destroy his bases so that enemy naval units could not get shore support
To establish a blockade off the East Pakistani coast
The Eastern Fleet effectively blockaded the ports of East Pakistan. Alizé and Hawker Sea Hawk aircraft from the INS Vikrant and the ships of the fleet bombarded Chittagong and Cox's Bazar.[16] The air strikes of INS Vikrant resulted in the sinking or rendering useless 11 merchant ships totalling 56914 tons.[17] The Eastern Fleet also enforced contraband control until tasked with an amphibious landing to cut off the land escape routes into Burma.[18]
On 11 December, the FOC-in-C ENC signalled the Eastern Fleet:
"Appreciate enemy with senior officers including FOCEF planning major breakout and will try to get away by hugging the coast. Senior officers may try to escape by air. Approaches to harbour likely to be mined.
"Your mission is:
(a) Put Chittagong airport out of commission.
(b) Attack ships in harbour by air and surface units if they break out.
This is undoubtedly the most important mission of the war in the East. The enemy ships must, I repeat, must, be destroyed. Good Luck."''[14]
The Indian Navy launched Operation Talwar on 25 May 1999. The entire Western Fleet had sailed from Mumbai to the North Arabian Sea to increase surveillance and adopt a deterrent posture. Elements of the Eastern Fleet joined the Western Fleet in the Arabian Sea later. The joint Western and Eastern Fleets blockaded the Pakistani ports (primarily the Karachi port).[19][20][21][22][23] They began aggressive patrols and threatened to cut Pakistan's sea trade. This exploited Pakistan's dependence on sea-based oil and trade flows.[24] Later, then-Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-scale war had broken out.[25][26][27][28]
^Bhatia (1977), p. 28: "Consequent on the partition of the country on 15 August 1947, two thirds of the undivided fleet and associated assets came to India."
^Sarma, S H (2001). My years at sea. Lancer Publishers & Distributors. pp. 159–160. ISBN978-8170621218.
^ abSarma, S H (2001). My years at sea. Lancer Publishers & Distributors. p. 154. ISBN978-8170621218.
^Krishnan, Nilakanta (2011). A Sailor's story. Punya Pub. p. 64. ISBN978-8189534141.
^Transition to guardianship : the Indian navy 1991-2000. Published by Principal Director of Administration, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy) [in association with] Lancer Publishers. 15 January 2010. ISBN978-1935501268.
.jpg)
_with_a_Sea_King_helicopter_during_Indo-Pakistani_war_of_1971.jpg)
_launches_an_Alize_aircraft_during_Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971.jpg)
!["Indian Navy | Rear Admiral R D Katari [www.bharat-rakshak.com]"](http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Galleries/History/Fore/Historic-40.jpg.html){kind=link}