In social choice, a no-show paradox is a surprising behavior in some voting rules, where a candidate loses an election as a result of having too many supporters.[1][2] More formally, a no-show paradox occurs when adding voters who prefer Alice to Bob causes Alice to lose the election to Bob.[3] Voting systems without the no-show paradox are said to satisfy the participation criterion.[4]
In systems that fail the participation criterion, a voter turning out to vote could make the result worse for them; such voters are sometimes referred to as having negative vote weights, particularly in the context of German constitutional law, where courts have ruled such a possibility violates the principle of one man, one vote.[5][6][7]
The no-show paradox is similar to, but not the same as, the perverse response paradox. Perverse response happens when an existing voter can make a candidate win by decreasing their rating of that candidate (or vice-versa). For example, under instant-runoff voting, moving a candidate from first-place to last-place on a ballot can cause them to win.[11]
The most common cause of no-show paradoxes is the use of instant-runoff (often called ranked-choice voting in the United States). In instant-runoff voting, a no-show paradox can occur even in elections with only three candidates, and occur in 50%-60% of all 3-candidate elections where the results of IRV disagree with those of plurality.[10][3]
An example with three parties (Top, Center, Bottom) is shown below. In this scenario, the Bottom party initially loses. However, say that a group of pro-Top voters joins the election, making the electorate more supportive of the Top party, and more strongly opposed to the Bottom party. This increase in the number of voters who rank Bottom last causes the Center candidate to lose to the Bottom party:
More-popular Bottom
Less-popular Bottom
Round 1
Round 2
Round 1
Round 2
Top
25N
+6
Top
31
46
Center
30
55Y
Center
30 N
Bottom
39
39
Bottom
39
54 Y
Thus the increase in support for the Top party allows it to defeat the Center party in the first round. This makes the election an example of a center-squeeze, a class of elections where instant-runoff and plurality have difficulty electing the majority-preferred candidate.[13]
Studies suggest such failures may be empirically rare, however. One study surveying 306 publicly-available election datasets found no participation failures for methods in the ranked pairs-minimax family.[19]
Certain conditions weaker than the participation criterion are also incompatible with the Condorcet criterion. For example, weak positive involvement requires that adding a ballot in which candidate A is one of the voter's most-preferred candidates does not change the winner away from A. Similarly, weak negative involvement requires that adding a ballot in which A is one of the voter's least-preferred does not make A the winner if it was not the winner before. Both conditions are incompatible with the Condorcet criterion.[20]
In fact, an even weaker property can be shown to be incompatible with the Condorcet criterion: it may be better for a voter to submit a completely reversed ballot than to submit a ballot that ranks all candidates honestly.[21]
In Germany, situations where a voter's ballot has the opposite of its intended effect (e.g. a vote for a party or candidate causes them to lose) are called negatives Stimmgewicht (lit.'negative voting weights'). An infamous example occurred in the 2005 German federal election, when an article in Der Spiegel laid out how CDU voters in Dresden I would have to vote against their own party if they wished to avoid losing a seat in the Bundestag.[5] This led to a lawsuit by electoral reform organization Mehr Demokratie [de] and Alliance 90/The Greens, joined by the neo-Nazi NDP of Germany, who argued the election law was undemocratic.[23]
A seat allocation procedure that allows an increase in votes to lead to a loss of seats, or results in more seats being won if [proportionally] fewer votes are cast for it, contradicts the meaning and purpose of a democratic election[...]
Such nonsensical relationships between voting and electoral success not only impair the equality of the right to vote and the equal opportunities of the parties, but also the principle of a popular election, as it is no longer apparent to the voter how their vote results in the success or failure of a candidate.[...]
Negative vote weights cannot be accepted as constitutional on the premise that they cannot be predicted or planned, and thus can hardly be influenced by the individual voter. To what extent this is true can be set aside, as such arbitrary results make a mockery of the democratic competition for support from the electorate.
The ruling forced the Bundestag to abandon its old practice of ignoring overhang seats, and instead adopt a new system of compensation involving leveling seats.[23]
Quorum requirements
A common cause of no-show paradoxes is the use of a quorum. For example, if a public referendum requires 50% turnout to be binding, additional "no" votes may push turnout above 50%, causing the measure to pass. A referendum that instead required a minimum number of yes votes (e.g. >25% of the population voting "yes") would pass the participation criterion.[25]
Many representative bodies have quorum requirements where the same dynamic can be at play. For example, the requirement for a two-thirds quorum in the Oregon Legislative Assembly effectively creates an unofficial two-thirds supermajority requirement for passing bills, and can result in a law passing if too many senators turn out to oppose it.[26] Deliberate ballot-spoiling strategies have been successful in ensuring referendums remain non-binding, as in the 2023 Polish referendum.
Manipulation
The participation criterion can also be justified as a weaker form of strategyproofness: while it is impossible for honesty to always be the best strategy (by Gibbard's theorem), the participation criterion guarantees honesty will always be an effective, rather than actively counterproductive, strategy (i.e. a voter can always safely cast a sincere vote).[1] This can be particularly effective for encouraging honest voting if voters exhibit loss aversion. Rules with no-show paradoxes do not always allow voters to cast a sincere vote; for example, a sincere Palin > Begich > Peltola voter in the 2022 Alaska special election would have been better off if they had not shown up at all, rather than casting an honest vote.
While no-show paradoxes can be deliberately exploited as a kind of strategic voting, systems that fail the participation criterion are typically considered to be undesirable because they expose the underlying system as logically incoherent or "spiteful" (actively seeking to violate the preferences of some voters).[27]
This example shows that majority judgment violates the participation criterion. Assume two candidates A and B with 5 potential voters and the following ratings:
Candidates
# of
voters
A
B
Excellent
Good
2
Fair
Poor
2
Poor
Good
1
The two voters rating A "Excellent" are unsure whether to participate in the election.
Voters not participating
Assume the 2 voters would not show up at the polling place.
The ratings of the remaining 3 voters would be:
Candidates
# of
voters
A
B
Fair
Poor
2
Poor
Good
1
The sorted ratings would be as follows:
Candidate
↓
Median point
A
B
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
Result: A has the median rating of "Fair" and B has the median rating of "Poor". Thus, A is elected majority judgment winner.
Voters participating
Now, consider the 2 voters decide to participate:
Candidates
# of
voters
A
B
Excellent
Good
2
Fair
Poor
2
Poor
Good
1
The sorted ratings would be as follows:
Candidate
↓
Median point
A
B
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
Result: A has the median rating of "Fair" and B has the median rating of "Good". Thus, B is the majority judgment winner.
Condorcet methods
This example shows how Condorcet methods can violate the participation criterion when there is a preference paradox. Assume four candidates A, B, C and D with 26 potential voters and the following preferences:
Result: A > D, B > C and D > B are locked in (and the other three can't be locked in after that), so the full ranking is A > D > B > C. Thus, A is elected ranked pairs winner.
Voters participating
Now, assume an extra 4 voters, in the top row, decide to participate:
Preferences
# of voters
A > B > C > D
4
A > D > B > C
8
B > C > A > D
7
C > D > B > A
7
The results would be tabulated as follows:
Pairwise election results
X
Y
A
B
C
D
A
Does not appear
14
12
14
12
7
19
B
12
14
Does not appear
7
19
15
11
C
12
14
19
7
Does not appear
8
18
D
19
7
11
15
18
8
Does not appear
Pairwise results for X, won-tied-lost
1-0-2
2-0-1
2-0-1
1-0-2
The sorted list of victories would be:
Pair
Winner
A (19) vs. D (7)
A 19
B (19) vs. C (7)
B 19
C (18) vs. D (8)
C 18
B (11) vs. D (15)
D 15
A (12) vs. B (14)
B 14
A (12) vs. C (14)
C 14
Result: A > D, B > C and C > D are locked in first. Now, D > B can't be locked in since it would create a cycle B > C > D > B. Finally, B > A and C > A are locked in. Hence, the full ranking is B > C > A > D. Thus, B is elected ranked pairs winner by adding a set of voters who prefer A to B.
^ abcMoulin, Hervé (1988-06-01). "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox". Journal of Economic Theory. 45 (1): 53–64. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0.
^ abMcCune, David; Wilson, Jennifer (2024-04-07). "The Negative Participation Paradox in Three-Candidate Instant Runoff Elections". arXiv:2403.18857 [physics.soc-ph].
^Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J. (1983-01-01). "Paradoxes of Preferential Voting". Mathematics Magazine. 56 (4): 207–214. doi:10.2307/2689808. JSTOR2689808.
^Graham-Squire, Adam T.; McCune, David (2023-06-12). "An Examination of Ranked-Choice Voting in the United States, 2004–2022". Representation: 1–19. arXiv:2301.12075. doi:10.1080/00344893.2023.2221689.
^Laslier, Jean-François; Sanver, M. Remzi, eds. (2010). Handbook on Approval Voting. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. p. 2. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7. ISBN978-3-642-02838-0. By eliminating the squeezing effect, Approval Voting would encourage the election of consensual candidates. The squeezing effect is typically observed in multiparty elections with a runoff. The runoff tends to prevent extremist candidates from winning, but a centrist candidate who would win any pairwise runoff (the "Condorcet winner") is also often "squeezed" between the left-wing and the right-wing candidates and so eliminated in the first round.
^ abMoulin, Hervé (1988-06-01). "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox". Journal of Economic Theory. 45 (1): 53–64. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0.
^Jimeno, José L.; Pérez, Joaquín; García, Estefanía (2009-01-09). "An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences". Social Choice and Welfare. 33 (3): 343–359. doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0360-6. ISSN0176-1714. S2CID30549097.
^Mohsin, F., Han, Q., Ruan, S., Chen, P. Y., Rossi, F., & Xia, L. (2023, May). Computational Complexity of Verifying the Group No-show Paradox. In Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 2877-2879).
^Sanver, M. Remzi; Zwicker, William S. (2009-08-20). "One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness". International Journal of Game Theory. 38 (4): 553–574. doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9. ISSN0020-7276. S2CID29563457.
^Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-08-29). "Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers". Public Choice. 197 (1–2): 1–62. doi:10.1007/s11127-023-01042-3. ISSN0048-5829. Of course, a method not satisfying participation will incentivize some strategic non-voting, as the voters in question will have an incentive not to vote (sincerely). But again, all voting methods incentivize strategic behavior[...] By contrast, we are troubled by failures of positive or negative involvement, as this shows that the method responds in the wrong way to unequivocal support for (resp. rejection of) a candidate.