Paul Snowdon and Anil Gomes, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, comment that Strawson "exerted a considerable influence on philosophy, both during his lifetime and, indeed, since his death."[6]
After his military service, he went initially to the (then) University College of North Wales at Bangor, as an assistant lecturer. After winning the John Locke scholarship in 1946, and the support of Gilbert Ryle, he went to University College, Oxford, initially as a lecturer, and then, from 1948, as a fellow.[5]
In philosophical methodology, there are (at least) two important and interrelated features of Strawson's work that are worthy of note.[9] The first is the project of a 'descriptive' metaphysics, and the second is his notion of a shared conceptual scheme, composed of concepts operated in everyday life. In his book Individuals (1959), Strawson attempts to describe various concepts that form an interconnected web, representing (part of) our common, shared, human conceptual scheme. In particular, he examines our conceptions of basic particulars, and how they are variously brought under general spatio-temporal concepts. What makes this a metaphysical project is that it exhibits, in fine detail, the structural features of our thought about the world, and thus precisely delimits how we, humans, think about reality.
Strawson distinguished between 'revisionary' and 'descriptive metaphysics', he wrote: "Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure".[10] The purpose of the former is to "lay bare the most general features of our conceptual scheme" and to understand structures which do not "readily display itself on the structures of language but lies submerged" by analysing those metaphysical concepts which have always existed. He lists Aristotle and Kant as descriptive and Descartes and Leibniz as revisionary.[11]
His obituary in The Guardian noted that "Oxford was the world capital of philosophy between 1950 and 1970, and American academics flocked there, rather than the traffic going the other way. That golden age had no greater philosopher than Sir Peter Strawson."[7]
In its obituary, The Times of London described him as a "philosopher of matchless range who made incisive, influential contributions to problems of language and metaphysics".[12] The author went on to say:
Few scholars achieve lasting fame as dramatically as did the philosopher Sir Peter Strawson. By 1950 Strawson, then a Fellow of University College, Oxford, was already a respected tutor and a promising member of the group of younger Oxford dons whose careful attention to the workings of natural languages marked them out as 'linguistic' philosophers. [He published] extraordinary papers, which are still read and discussed more than 50 years later and which are prescribed to tyros as models of philosophical criticism.[12]
"Perception and Identification" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 35, 1961)
"Carnap's Views on Constructed Systems v. Natural Languages in Analytical Philosophy" in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. P.A. Schilpp (La Salle Ill.: Open Court, 1963)
" A Problem about Truth: A reply to Mr. Warnock" in Truth, ed. G. Pitcher, Englewood Cliffs (N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964)
"Truth: A Reconsideration of Austin's Views" (Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15, 1965)
"Self, Mind and Body" (Common Factor, Vol. 4, 1966)
"Is Existence Never A Predicate" (Critica, Vol. 1, 1967)
"Bennett on Kant's Analytic" (Philosophical Review, Vol. 77, 1968), reprinted in Philosophical Writings (2011)
"Meaning and Truth" (Proceedings of the British Academy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969)
"Imagination and Perception" in Experience and Theory, ed. L. Foster and J.W. Swanson (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970)
"Categories" in Ryle: A Collection of Critical essays, ed. O.P. Wood and G. Pitcher, (New York: Doubleday, 1970)
"The Asymmetry of Subjects and Predicates" in Language, Belief and Metaphysics, ed. H.E. Kiefer and M.K. Munitz (New York: State of University of New York Press, 1970)
"Self-Reference, Contradiction and Content-Parasitic Predicates" (Indian review of Philosophy, 1972)
"Different Conceptions of Analytical Philosophy" (Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 1973)
"Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'" in Essays on J.L. Austin, ed. I Berlin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973)
"On Understanding the Structure of One's Language" in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays
"Positions for Quantifiers" in Semantics and Philosophy, ed. M.K. Munitz and P.K. Unger (New York: New York University Press, 1974)
"Does Knowledge Have Foundations?" (Conocimiento y Creencia, 1974), reprinted in Philosophical Writings (2011)
"Semantics, Logic and Ontology" (Neue Häfte für Philosophie, 1975)
"Knowledge and Truth" (Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1976), reprinted in Philosophical Writings (2011)
"Entity and Identity" in Contemporary British Philosophy Fourth Series, ed. H.D. Lewis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976)
"Scruton and Wright on Anti-Realism" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 77, 1976)
"May Bes and Might Have Beens" in Meaning and Use, ed. A. Margalit (London: Reidel, 1979)
"Perception and its Objects" in Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.J. Ayer, ed. G.F. Macdonald (London: Macmillan, 1979)
"Belief, Reference and Quantification" (Monist, 1980)
"P.F. Strawson Replies" in Philosophical Subjects Presented to P.F. Strawson, ed. Zak Van Straaten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980)
"Comments and Reples" (Philosophia, Vol. 10, 1981)
"Logical Form and Logical Constants" in Logical Form, Predication and Ontology, ed. P.K. Sen (India: Macmillan, 1982)
"Liberty and Necessity" in Spinoza, His Thought & Work, ed. Nathan Rotenstreich and Norma Schneider (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1983), reprinted in Analysis and Metaphysics (1992)
"Causation and Explanation" in Essays on Davidson, ed. Bruce Vermazen and J. Hintikka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), reprinted in Analysis and Metaphysics (1992)
"Direct Singular Reference: Intended Reference and Actual Reference" in Wo steht die Analytische Philosophie Heute?, 1986
"Reference and its Roots" in The Philosophy of W.V. Quine. ed L.E. Hahn and P.A. Schilpp (La Salle Ill.: Open Court, 1986)
"Kant's Paralogisms: Self Consciousness and the 'Outside Observer'" in Theorie der Subjektivität, ed. K. Cramer, F. Fulda, R.-P. Hortsmann, U. Poshast (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987)
"Concepts and Properties, or Predication and Copulation" (Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, 1987)
"Kant's New Foundations of Metaphysics" in Metaphysik nach Kant, ed. Dieter Henrich and R.-P. Horstmann (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1988)
"Ma Philosophie: son développement, son thème central et sa nature générale" (Revue de thėologie et de philosophie, Vol. 120, 1988)
"Sensibility, Understanding and the Doctrine of Synthesis: Comments on D. Henrich and P. Guyer" in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. E. Forster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989)
"Two Conceptions of Philosophy" in Perspectives on Quine, ed. Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell: 1990)
"The Incoherence of Empiricism" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 66, 1992)
"Comments on Some Aspects of Peter Unger's Identity, Consciousness and Value (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 42, 1992)
"Echoes of Kant" (Times Literary Supplement, 1992, "The State of Philosophy")
"Replies" in Ensayos sobre Strawson, ed. Carlos E. Carosi (Montevideo: Universidad de la Republica, 1992)
"My Philosophy" and "Replies" to critics in The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson, ed. P.K. Sen and R.K. Verma (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1994)
"Individuals" in Philosophical Problems Today, Vol. 1, ed. G. Floistad (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994)
"The Problem of Realism and the A Priori" in Kant and Contemporary Epistemology, ed. Paolo Parrini (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994)
"Introduction", "Kant on Substance" and "Meaning and Context" in Entity and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
Notes
^Personal reactive attitudes are reactions we display when we are hurt by the actions of an agent (see Strawson, P. F. (2008), Freedom and resentment and other essays, Routledge, p. 12).
^N. Milkov, A Hundred Years of English Philosophy, Springer, 2013, p. 201.
^Clifford A. Brown, Peter Strawson, Routledge, 2015, p. 51.
Snowdon, Paul, "Strawson, Peter Frederick, 1919-2006", Proceedings of the British Academy, V. 150 Biographical Memoirs of Fellows, VI. pp. 221–244 (2008)