Religious nationalism can be understood in a number of ways, such as nationalism as a religion itself, a position articulated by Carlton Hayes in his text Nationalism: A Religion, or as the relationship of nationalism to a particular religious belief, dogma, ideology, or affiliation. This relationship can be broken down into two aspects: the politicisation of religion and the influence of religion on politics.[1]
In the former aspect, a shared religion can be seen to contribute to a sense of national unity, a common bond among the citizens of the nation. Another political aspect of religion is the support of a national identity, similar to a shared ethnicity, language, or culture. The influence of religion on politics is more ideological, where current interpretations of religious ideas inspire political activism and action; for example, laws are passed to foster stricter religious adherence.[2]
Ideologically-driven religious nationalism may not necessarily be targeted against other religions per se, but can be articulated in response to modernity and, in particular, secular nationalism. Indeed, religious nationalism may articulate itself as the binary of secular nationalism. Nation-states whose borders are relatively recent or that have experienced colonialism may be more prone to religious nationalism, which may stand as a more authentic or "traditional" rendering of identity. Thus, there was a global rise of religious nationalism in the wake of the end of the Cold War, but also as postcolonial politics (facing considerable developmental challenges, but also dealing with the reality of colonially-defined, and therefore somewhat artificial, borders) became challenged. In such a scenario, appealing to a national sense of Islamic identity, as in the case of Pakistan (see two-nation theory), may serve to override regional tensions.
The danger is that when the state derives political legitimacy from adherence to religious doctrines, this may leave an opening to overtly religious elements, institutions, and leaders, making the appeals to religion more 'authentic' by bringing more explicitly theological interpretations to political life. Thus, appeals to religion as a marker of ethnicity create an opening for more strident and ideological interpretations of religious nationalism. Many ethnic and cultural nationalisms include religious aspects, but as a marker of group identity, rather than the intrinsic motivation for nationalist claims.
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism is a political ideology that combines a focus on Sinhalese culture and ethnicity with an emphasis on Theravada Buddhism, which is the majority belief system of the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.
The Patriotic Association of Myanmar and 969 movement have the goal to "organise and protect" the Burman people and their Buddhist religion, which is influenced by Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar.
Christian nationalists focus more on internal politics, such as passing laws that reflect their view of Christianity. In countries with a state Church, Christian nationalists, in seeking to preserve the status of a Christian state, uphold an antidisestablishmentarian position.[4][5][6] They actively promote religious (Christian) discourses in various fields of social life, from politics and history to culture and science; with respect to legislation for example, Christian nationalists advocate Sunday blue laws.[7] Distinctive radicalized forms of religious nationalism or clerical nationalism (clero-nationalism or clerico-nationalism) were emerging on the far-right of the political spectrum in various European countries especially during the interwar period in the first half of the 20th century.[8]
In the Middle Ages, efforts were made to establish a Pan-Christian state by uniting the countries within Christendom.[9][10] Christian nationalism played a role in this era in which Christians felt the impulse to recover lands in which Christianity flourished.[11] After the rise of Islam, certain parts of North Africa, East Asia, Southern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East lost Christian control.[12]
In Poland, nationalism was always characterized by loyalty to the Catholic Church. Groups like the National Revival of Poland use slogans like Wielka Polska Katolicka (Great Catholic Poland) and protest vigorously against legalization of gay marriage and abortion.[13] Conservative religious groups connected with Radio Maryja are often accused of harboring nationalist and antisemitic attitudes.[14]
Religious nationalism which is characterized by communal adherence to Eastern Orthodoxy and national Orthodox Churches is found in many states of Eastern Europe as well as in the Russian Federation.
Hindutva (meaning "Hinduness"), a term popularised by Hindu nationalist Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 1923, is the predominant form of Hindu nationalism in India.[18] Hindutva is championed by right-wing Hindu nationalist volunteer organisation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), widely regarded as the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party's parent organisation, along with its affiliate organisations, notably the Vishva Hindu Parishad.
Unlike the secular form of nationalism which is espoused in most other countries, Pakistani nationalism is religious in nature, consisting of Islamic nationalism. Religion was the basis of the Pakistani nationalist narrative. (see Secularism in Pakistan)[19] Pakistani nationalism is closely associated with Muslim heritage, the religion of Islam, and it is also associated with Pan-Islamism, as it is described in the Two-nation theory. It also refers to the consciousness and the expression of religious and ethnic influences that help mould the national consciousness. Pakistan has been called a "global center for political Islam".[20]
Religious Zionism is an ideology that combines Zionism and Orthodox Judaism. Before the establishment of the State of Israel, most Religious Zionists were observant Jews who supported Zionist efforts to rebuild a Jewish state in the Land of Israel. After the Six-Day War, and the capture of the West Bank, right-wing supporters of the Religious Zionist movement integrated themselves into Israeli nationalism and they eventually founded a new movement which evolved into Neo-Zionism, the ideology of Neo-Zionism revolves around three pillars: the Land of Israel, the People of Israel, and the Torah of Israel.[23]
Romanticist interest in non-classical antiquity coincided with the rise of Romantic nationalism and the rise of the nation state in the context of the 1848 revolutions, leading to the creation of national epics and national myths for the various newly formed states. Pagan or folkloric topics were also common in the musical nationalism of the period.[24][25]
The "State Shinto" term was used to categorize, and promote, Imperial Japanese practices that relied on Shinto to support Japan's nationalistic ideology.[26]: 133 [27]: 97 By refusing to ban Shinto practices outright, Japan's post-war constitution was thus able to preserve full freedom of religion.[26]: 133
In the Korean peninsula, the Donghak movement and its leader, Choe Je-u, were inspired by Korean Catholic missionaries. However, they condemned the 'Western learning' preached by missionaries and contrasted it with the indigenous 'Eastern learning'. They started a rebellion in 1894 in Jeolla province in southwestern Korea. The Donghak movement served as a template for the later Daejonggyo and Jeungsan-gyo movements, as well as for other religious nationalist movements. The Buddhist-influenced Daejonggyo movement financed guerillas in Manchuria during Japanese colonial rule of both Korea and Manchuria. The North Korean state ideology, Juche, is sometimes classified as a religion in the United States Department of State's human rights reports.[30]
^Bloomberg, Charles (1989). Christian Nationalism and the Rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond in South Africa, 1918-48. Springer. p. xxiii-11. ISBN978-1-349-10694-3.
^Kymlicka, Will (19 April 2018). "Is there a Christian Pluralist Approach to Immigration?". Comment Magazine. Retrieved 14 March 2020. As against both Christian nationalists who wanted an established church and French-republican-style secular nationalists who wanted a homogenous public square devoid of religion, Dutch pluralists led by Kuyper defended a model of institutional pluralism or "sphere sovereignty."
^Moleah, Alfred T. (1993). South Africa: Colonialism, Apartheid and African Dispossession. Disa Press. p. 377. ISBN978-0-913255-02-5.
^Snyder, Louis L. (1990). Encyclopedia of Nationalism. St. James Press. p. 282. ISBN978-1-55862-101-5. Major religions in the past, especially Christianity, have attempted to include all their adherents in a large union, but they have not been successful. Throughout most of the Middle Ages in Western Europe, attempts were made again and again to unite all the Christian world into a kind of Pan-Christianity, which would combine all Christians in a secular-religious state as a successor to the Roman Empire.
^Snyder, Louis Leo (1984). Macro-nationalisms: A History of the Pan-movements. Greenwood Press. p. 129. ISBN978-0-313-23191-9. Throughout the better part of the Middle Ages, elaborate attempts were made to create what was, in effect, a Pan-Christianity, an effort to unite "all" the Western Christian world into a successor state of the Roman Empire.
^Parole de l'Orient, Volume 30. Université Saint-Esprit. 2005. p. 488.
^Lewis, Bernard Ellis; Churchill, Buntzie Ellis (2008). Islam: The Religion and the People. Pearson Prentice Hall. p. 76. ISBN978-0-13-271606-2.
^Ḥaqqānī, Husain (2005). Pakistan: between mosque and military. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 131. ISBN0-87003-214-3. Retrieved 23 May 2010. Zia ul-Haq is often identified as the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam. ...
^ abHardacre, Helen (1991). Shintō and the state, 1868–1988 (1st paperback print. ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN9780691020525.
^Shimazono, Susumu (2005-12-01). "State Shinto in the Lives of the People: The Establishment of Emperor Worship, Modern Nationalism, and Shrine Shinto in Late Meiji". Journal of the American Academy of Religion. 73 (4): 1077–1098. doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfi115.
