19世紀末期的功利主義代表人物亨利·西季威克認為功利主義來自對「常識」的道德系統的反省。他論證多數的常識道德被要求建立在功利主義基礎上。他也認為功利主義能解決常識學說的模糊和前後矛盾而產生的困難和困惑之處。在20世紀功利主義雖然經過乔治·爱德华·摩尔的批判,但英美哲學家與英國自然科學家兼倫理學家圖爾明(Stephen Edelston Toulmin)、牛津大學的諾埃爾-史密斯(Patrick Nowell-Smith)、厄姆森(J.O. Urmson)以及澳大利亞的斯馬特(J. J. C. Smart)等人仍為功利主義辯護。
^White, Stuart, Zalta, Edward N. , 编, Social Minimum, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2015 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University), 2015 [2018-10-03], (原始内容存档于2019-03-18)
^Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Schneewind, J. B. (编). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. 2002: 552. ISBN 978-0521003049. In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs, we retract our first sentiment, and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and evil.
^Hutcheson, Francis. The Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Schneewind, J. B. (编). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. 2002: 515. ISBN 978-0521003049.
^Gay, John. Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality. Schneewind, J. B. (编). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. 2002: 408. ISBN 978-0521003049. happiness, private happiness, is the proper or ultimate end of all our actions… each particular action may be said to have its proper and peculiar end…(but)…. they still tend or ought to tend to something farther; as is evident from hence, viz. that a man may ask and expect a reason why either of them are pursued: now to ask the reason of any action or pursuit, is only to enquire into the end of it: but to expect a reason, i.e. an end, to be assigned for an ultimate end, is absurd. To ask why I pursue happiness, will admit of no other answer than an explanation of the terms.
^Gay, John. Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality. Schneewind, J. B. (编). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. 2002: 404–05. ISBN 978-0521003049. Now it is evident from the nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his goodness manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore the means of their happiness: therefore that my behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the happiness of mankind, should be such…thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the wilt of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed…(and)… I am to do whatever lies in my power towards promoting the happiness of mankind.
^Schneewind, J. B. Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. 2002: 446. ISBN 978-0521003049.
^Schneewind, J. B. Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. 2002: 446. ISBN 978-0521003049.
^Briggs, Rachael, Edward N. Zalta , 编, Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University), 2017 [November 15, 2017], (原始内容存档于2019-04-29), One objection to this interpretation of utility is that there may not be a single good (or indeed any good) which rationality requires us to seek. But if we understand “utility” broadly enough to include all potentially desirable ends—pleasure, knowledge, friendship, health and so on—it's not clear that there is a unique correct way to make the tradeoffs between different goods so that each outcome receives a utility. There may be no good answer to the question of whether the life of an ascetic monk contains more or less good than the life of a happy libertine—but assigning utilities to these options forces us to compare them.
^Marx, Karl. Chapter 24: Conversion of Surplus-Value into Capital. Das Kapital Volume One. Wikisource. 1867 [2019-04-21]. (原始内容存档于2019-04-21) (英语). With the driest naivete he takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man. Whatever is useful to this queer normal man, and to his world, is absolutely useful. This yard-measure, then, he applies to past, present, and future. The Christian religion, e.g., is "useful," "because it forbids in the name of religion the same faults that the penal code condemns in the name of the law." Artistic criticism is "harmful," because it disturbs worthy people in their enjoyment of Martin Tupper, etc. With such rubbish has the brave fellow, with his motto, "nulla dies sine linea [no day without a line]", piled up mountains of books.